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Facts
The Constitutional Court on 18th February 2020 rendered its judgment in the case of Chishimba
Kambwili v Attorney General 2019/CCZ/009. The petitioner, then an estranged Member of
Parliament for the ruling Patriotic Front (PF), had his seat declared vacant in February 2019 by
the Speaker of the National Assembly, Patrick Matibini, on the ground that by acting as a
consultant for an opposition party (under which he was not elected to Parliament), he had
crossed the floor.

Holding
The Constitutional Court found the action of the Speaker to have been unconstitutional as the
office is not vested with power to interpret or resolve constitutional problems. This power is
vested in the judiciary and the Speaker, therefore, usurped the powers of the judiciary.
However, despite finding that the Speaker acted unconstitutionally in unseating the petitioner,
the Constitutional Court dismissed the petition and declined to grant any remedy. This
commentary argues that the decision of the Constitutional Court in this respect is incorrect,
negates the supremacy of the Constitution and demonstrates lack of appreciation of basic
considerations for constitutional adjudication.

Significance
One of the first things that is shocking about the judgment is the apparent failure to understand
the remedy sought by the petitioner. Page 2 of the judgment lists the remedies sought by the
petitioner. The first and arguably most important remedy is stated as “a declaration and order
that the ruling of the Speaker dated 27th February, 2019 is null and void ab initio.” It is clear
from this that the petitioner sought the remedy of a declaration of invalidity, whose effect would
be to render null and void, the Speaker’s decision to unseat the petitioner. Nowhere in its entire
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judgment, does the Constitutional Court discuss this remedy. For reasons not stated in the
judgment, the Constitutional Court instead discusses the remedy of a declaratory judgment and
proceeds to assert that it has discretion to decline to grant it. The two remedies – declaratory
judgement and a declaration of invalidity - are completely different.

On the one hand, a declaratory judgment simply defines the rights of the parties relative to the
legal question under consideration. It indicates whether the parties may seek or are entitled to
the relief they desire. In the words of Borchard, “their distinctive characteristic lies in the fact
that they constitute merely an authoritative confirmation of the already existing relations.” 4
Such declaratory judgments at common law are granted at the discretion of the Court. From
the record, it is clear that this is not the remedy the petitioner sought from the Constitutional
Court.

On the other hand, a declaration of invalidity as a constitutional remedy nullifies any law or
action that violates the provisions of the Constitution. Once the Constitutional Court arrives at
the conclusion that a provision of the Constitution has been violated, it retains no discretion,
and must issue a mandatory order of invalidity. The mandatory order or declaration of
invalidity is premised on the supremacy of the Constitution for the reason that anything done
in violation of the Constitution is a nullity. This is the unambiguous import of Article 1(1) and
(2) of the Constitution of Zambia, which provides that the Constitution is the supreme law of
the Republic of Zambia and any other written law or practice that is inconsistent with its
provisions is void to the extent of the inconsistency. Further, Article 1(2) of the Constitution
unequivocally provides that any act or omission that contravenes the Constitution is illegal.
The consequences of any illegality, more so in violation of the Constitution, must be remedied;
and the Constitutional Court is accordingly enslaved to so act by the supreme law.

As constitutional law scholar, Pierre De Vos has asserted, it is mandatory for the Court to issue
an order of invalidity against laws or actions that violate the provisions of the Constitution and
further that this “obligation to declare law or conduct that is inconsistent with the Constitution
to be invalid flows logically from the fact that the Constitution is supreme." 5 In relation to
granting of an order of invalidity as a constitutional remedy, the Constitutional Court, therefore,
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enjoys no discretion and should have unambiguously declared the Speaker’s action null and
void.

It is beyond comprehension that a specialised Constitutional Court could misdirect itself in
such a manner as evidenced by this judgment. It is clear that the petitioner sought an order of
invalidity but the Constitutional Court instead, and unmoved by anyone, formulated its own
remedy and dismissed it of its own accord. No reasons are advanced by the Constitutional
Court for this decision. It however appears, that the Constitutional Court was following its own
precedent of substituting claimants’ legal questions, on its own motion as established in Danny
Pule and 3 others v. The Attorney- General and Davies Mwila 6 (the ‘Presidential Eligibility’
Case) where the applicants’ two questions were substituted by the Constitutional Court’s new
and single one. If we were to hazard a guess, it would seem that the Constitutional Court was
apprehensive of the political consequences of invalidating the Speaker’s unconstitutional
decision. The Constitutional Court cited two potential ‘disruptions’ it sought to avoid. First,
the Constitutional Court took the view that the petitioner was already replaced as a Member of
Parliament in a by-election; and secondly, that nullifying the Speaker’s decision would mean
having two Members of Parliament for the same constituency, which, in the eyes of the
Constitutional Court, would result in a constitutional crisis.

Two things can be said about the approach taken by the Constitutional Court. First, when a
Court is overly concerned about the political consequences of its decisions, and makes
decisions on the basis of its interpretation of supposed consequences without elaborating any
objective standard test for its action, such a Court opens itself to perceptions of acting in
furtherance of personal inclinations and against the rule of law. Having judicial officers who
make decisions that tie their findings to political consequences, basically invites them to make
subjective evaluation of consequences of their prospective decisions. Such an approach to
constitutional adjudication, warned retired Ugandan Supreme Court judge, George
Kanyeihamba, “transports the judge from the heights of legality and impartiality to the deep
valleys of personal inclinations and political judgment.” 7
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Secondly, the position of the Constitutional Court that there would be a constitutional crisis as
there was an already held by-election, which had replaced the petitioner, does not hold water.
It in fact betrays a tragic misunderstanding of constitutional law by the Court. Where a law or
an act offends the Constitution, it is becomes wholly invalid, or void ab initio. In this case, it
would have meant reverting to the status quo prior to the Speaker’s decision. There would,
therefore be no other Member of Parliament for the concerned constituency except the
petitioner in the eyes of the law. There is a lot of comparative academic literature and
jurisprudence that the Constitutional Court could have explored to settle at a more informed
decision. For instance, the Nigerian case of Amaechi vs. Independent National Electoral
Commission and Others, 8 involving a state governorship election is illustrative. The Nigerian
Constitution and electoral laws required parties to have primary elections for selecting
candidates. Those who won primaries were the legally recognised political party candidates.
The petitioner stood as a candidate for a governorship primary and won the election and, was
therefore, by law, supposed to be the concerned party’s candidate in the election. His political
party, however, declined to adopt him and gave the adoption certificate to another person who
was not selected through primaries. This new person stood as a state governor and won the
election. In the ensuing legal battle, the Nigerian Supreme Court held that the person who was
declared winner of the state governorship position was in fact not the rightful winner and
therefore annulled his election and declared the petitioner as the legitimate governor. The
Nigeria Supreme Court reasoned that the replacement of the petitioner was illegal and a nullity
as his candidature was in violation of the Constitution and the law. Consequently, in the eyes
of the law, the petitioner was the one who was adopted as a candidate, and therefore, the rightful
governor.

The approach taken by the Nigerian Supreme Court is the more legally and procedurally correct
one because no act that violates constitutional provisions must be given validity. As noted
already, this derives from and gives effect to the doctrine of the supremacy of the Constitution.
To hold otherwise is to desecrate the Constitution. This however, is not to argue that orders of
invalidity cannot be disruptive. They can and there is well-developed comparative
jurisprudence on how judges can tailor orders of invalidity to specific contexts in order to
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contain the consequences of invalidity. 9 This, however, is not what the Constitutional Court in
Zambia did.

Finally, we wish to point out the potential dangers of the judgment. Democracy scholars,
Steven Levitsky and Daniel Ziblatt, in a 2018 publication, 10 extensively study the current
global phenomena of democratic backsliding. Unlike in the past when democracies could be
killed by dramatic events such military coups, the authors carefully demonstrate that the current
backlash against democracy is subtle, invisible and lets democracy erode slowly through minor
often seemingly inconsequential acts. This new phenomenon of killing democracy does not use
generals or military personnel but weaponises the same institutions created to protect rule of
law and democracy. This is facilitated by such institutions making subtle decisions which,
cumulatively and overtime, prove extremely potent in undermining democracy.

The Constitutional Court judgment seems to validate Levitsky and Ziblatt’s well-reasoned
views. It is a decision that rewards rather than punishes those who mutilate the Constitution.
The Constitutional Court’s reasoning, when pushed to its logical conclusion, entails that where
someone violates the Constitution, and that violation causes a disruption, it follows that the
norms of the Constitution cannot be enforced. Obeying the Constitution becomes optional for
the ruling elite. Under this thinking, the consequences of the misconduct take precedence over
the supremacy of the Constitution. The ruling elite are, therefore, allowed to mutilate the
Constitution and get away with it, given the full imprimatur of the Constitutional Court. It goes
without saying that such an approach to constitutional adjudication is an abnegation of the rule
of law and the abdication of the duty of the judge as a guardian of constitutionalism and
enforcer of constitutional norms. Retired South African Constitutional law judge, Albie Sachs
correctly admonished judges when he said, “it would be a strange interpretation of our
Constitution that suggests that adherence by the government in any of its activities to the
foundational norms that paved the way to its creation was merely an option and not a duty.” 11

In his recently published book, Supreme Court judge, Mumba Malila, asserts that during his
time as a law lecturer at the University of Zambia, he endeavoured to use Zambian case law
9
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authorities in his pedagogical work. He was, however, often disappointed that many decisions
from the Courts tended to fall short in some vital respects as they were “poorly researched,
lacklustre and deficient in depth or clarity.” 12 Justice Malila’s words ring true about this
judgment as the decision is lacking in depth, undermines the supremacy of the Constitution and
demonstrates a tragic misunderstanding of Constitutional law by the Court.
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